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CORPORATIONS - DIRECTORS - VALIDITY OF BY-LAW PERMITIING REMOVAL 
OF DIRECTORS WITHOUT CAUSE -A by-law of defendant, a Delaware corpo-
ration, permitted removal of a director with or without cause by a majority 
vote of the stockholders.1 The certificate of incorporation provided for a 
staggered board system which divided the board of directors into three 
groups, the term of one group expiring at each annual meeting. At a special 
stockholders' meeting three directors were removed without cause. Plain-
tiff, majority stockholder of the corporation, instituted an action to deter-
mine the validity of the removal. Held, the three directors were improperly 
removed since the by-law which allowed removal without cause was incon-
sistent with the certificate of incorporation and therefore void. Essential 
1 The by-law involved in the principal case had become a common one for Delaware 
corporations and was generally thought, by the bar of that state, to be valid. Proceedings 
at the Annual Meeting of the Section of Corporation, Banking, and Business Law IO Bus. 
LA.w 9, 10-11 (1954). ' 
1961] RECENT DECISIONS 641 
Enterprises Corp. v. Automatic Steel Products, Inc., 159 A.2d 288 (Del. Ch. 
1960). 
In deciding this case, the court stated that the issue involved was one 
of construction only.2 However, this statement of the issue raises two diffi-
culties. First, the court appears to have overlooked at least one essential 
difference between the certificate of incorporation and the by-laws. In 
Delaware the certificate of incorporation is required to set forth only a 
minimal amount of information which primarily concerns the corporation's 
external relations with the state.3 The by-laws, on the other hand, are 
intended to supplement the certificate by filling in its skeletal structure with 
details governing the internal relationships of the members, directors, and 
officers of the corporation.4 Therefore, the fact that the certificate does not 
authorize the removal of directors by the stockholders does not necessarily 
support the inference that the incorporators intended that the directors be 
immune from this form of stockholder control. Secondly, by laying the 
cornerstone of this decision on the issue of construction only, the court has 
chosen a logically unsound foundation. If the issue in this case actually 
involves construction only, the validity of a by-law which authorized the 
removal of directors for cause, when tested by the same criteria, would also 
be in jeopardy, for the court's construction seemed to be premised upon 
the fact that the by-law placed a limitation upon the director's tenure which 
was not specifically authorized by the certificate of incorporation. More-
over, this standard would also invalidate a by-law which allowed the removal 
of a member of a non-staggered board. Yet it appears settled that stock-
holders do have the right to remove a director for good cause, and to express 
this right in by-law form.11 
Actually, the Delaware court was deciding not a problem of construction, 
but rather a policy conflict between greater stockholder control of the board 
and the desire for maximum stability in corporate management. The Dela-
ware statuteso neither permit nor deny to stockholders the right to remove 
directors, with or without cause, although one statute contains language 
which seems to contemplate the possibility of removal of a director before 
2 Principal case at 290. 
3 In particular, the Delaware statute requires only that the certificate of incorporation 
set forth the name of the corporation; the principal office or place of business, and the 
name of the resident agent; the nature of the business to be carried on; the amount of 
authorized stock, and if more than one class of stock is to be issued, the po,\·ers and 
privileges of each class; the names and addresses of the incorporators; the duration of the 
corporation's existence; and whether the private property of the stockholders is to be 
subject to payment of corporate debts. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102 (1953). 
4 The statutes of several states expressly provide that the by-laws shall stipulate 
whether or not the stockholders shall possess the removal power; see, e.g., ORE. REv. STAT. 
§ 57.185 (1955); TE.x. Bus. CORP. Acr art. 2.32 (1956); W. VA. CoDE ANN. § 31-1-20 (1955). 
u Campbell v. Loew's, Inc., 134 A.2d 852 (Del. Ch. 1957); Markovitz v. Markovitz, 336 
Pa. 145, 8 A.2d 46 (1939); In the Matter of Koch, 257 N.Y. 318, 178 N.E. 545 (1931); Fox 
v. Cody, 141 Misc. 552, 252 N.Y. Supp. 395 (Sup. Ct. 1930); Toledo Traction, Light & 
Power Co. v. Smith, 205 Fed. 643 (N.D. Ohio 1913). 
6 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 101-517 (1953). 
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the expiration of his term.7 Only the New York courts have previously 
faced the issue of removal without cause without the aid of e..xpress statutory 
provision for such removal. The New York courts have consistently upheld 
the right of stockholders to adopt a by-law permitting the removal of di-
rectors at any time, with or without cause.8 These decisions rest upon the 
premise that the denial of this right to stockholders tends to result in the 
denial of adequate stockholder control over the policy-making body of the 
corporation. 9 
The court in the principal case argued that the exercise of the power 
granted in this by-law would frustrate the "plan and purpose" behind the 
staggered board system.10 With this rather expansive statement, the court 
has, in effect, concluded that the section of the Delaware corporation law 
which permits classification of the board contains a legislative policy pro-
hibiting, at least in the absence of an express provision in the certificate, 
stockholder removal of directors without cause. There is no language in 
this statute, or in any other Delaware statute, which would support this con-
clusion. In so deciding, the court ignored the fact that the defendant cor-
poration was the product of a merger, and that the merger agreement con-
stituted a contract between the stockholders of the constituent corporations. 
In this agreement the parties contracted both to classify the board of direc-
tors of the new corporation and to reserve for themselves, in a by-law, an 
effective form of control over the board. Only a very clear statement of 
legislative policy should be allowed to nullify the provisions of this contract. 
The avowed purpose of the classified directorate is to preserve continuity 
of management; this can be obtained only by the sacrifice of a certain 
degree of stockholder control over the board.11 Contrary to the court's re-
action, it can be argued that where a corporation has classified its board of 
directors, the stockholders' removal power might produce an appropriate 
balance of power between the board and the stockholders. The state legis-
latures in the past have not proved to be effective catalysts in the solution 
of this problem, though there now appears to be a legislative trend toward 
7 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 223 (1953) provides in part: "Vacancies and newly created 
directorships ... may be filled by a majority of the directors then in office ••• and the 
directors so chosen shall hold office until the next annual election and until their successors 
are duly elected and qualified, unless sooner displaced . ••. " (Emphasis added.) 
s In the Matter of Singer, 189 Misc. 150 (Sup. Ct. 1947); Abberger v. Kulp, 156 Misc. 
210, 281 N.Y. Supp. 373 (Sup. Ct. 1935); In the Matter of Schwartz, 119 Misc. 387, 196 N.Y. 
Supp. 679 (Sup. Ct. 1922). These cases would seem to be peculiarly applicable to the 
principal case since neither New York nor Delaware provide a statutory scheme for re-
moval of directors, while both states permit classification of boards of directors. 
9 General stockholder apathy prevents effective utilization of this control device. 
However, its existence is important where majority control shifts, or changes hands alto-
gether between annual elections. 
10 Principal case at 291. 
11 Additionally, a staggered board may effectively sterilize the ability of minority inter-
ests to gain representation on the board through cumulative voting. See Sell & Fuge, Impact 
of Classified Corporate Directorates on the Constitutional Right of Cumulative Voting, 
17 U. Prrr. L. REv. 151 (1956). 
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protection and expansion of the stockholder democracy.12 In the absence 
of any indication from the court's opinion that the removal power has been 
abused in those instances when it has been exercised,13 it is suggested that 
the Delaware court has exceeded the limits of judicial restraint in striking 
down this by-law. If, as the court said,14 "reasonable predictability in our 
business society" is of such paramount importance that it must prevail over 
the interests of the owners of the corporation, then it is for the legislature 
to make this decision by expressly denying to the stockholders the power to 
remove directors without cause. 
Timothy F. Scanlon 
12 The statutes of eighteen states now permit directors to be removed by the stock.-
holders without cause. HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 389 n.68 (1959). 
Fifteen of these states also permit classification of boards of directors. Id., § 384 nn. 33-38. 
In addition, twenty-one states have, by constitutional provision, made cumulative voting 
for directors mandatory, and seventeen other states have adopted permissive cumulative 
voting statutes. Young, TIie Case for Cumulative Yoting, 1950 WIS. L. R.Ev. 49, 54. 
13 Where the power has been conferred by statute, there is little evidence that it has 
been frequently used. WILLIAMS, CUMULATIVE VOTING FOR DIRECTORS 57 (1951). 
H Principal case at 291. 
